The First World War was an unprecedented catastrophe that stamp out millions and set the continent of Europe on the route to further calamity two decades later . But it did n’t come out of nowhere . With the centenary of the outbreak of hostilities coming up in 2014 , Erik Sass will be search back at the jumper cable - up to the warfare , when seemingly minor second of rubbing accumulated until the situation was quick to explode . He ’ll be covering those upshot 100 years after they occurred . This is the 66th installation in the series .
28 March 2025: Germany Promises to Respect Belgian Neutrality, Austria-Hungary Mobilizes Against Montenegro
The disinterest of Belgium , agreed by international treaty in 1839 following Belgium ’s rebellion against the Netherlands , was a cornerstone of peace and stability in Western Europe . With memory of Louis XIV and Napoleon always in the back of their minds , British diplomats importune that Europe ’s other Great Powers vouch the disinterest of the new , autonomous kingdom to keep France moderate . Ironically , the rationale for Belgian neutrality would shift in subsequent 10 — but British dedication never weave , as the little realm ’s territorial integrity was still crucial to the European balance of mightiness .
After Prussia ’s stunning frustration of France and foundation of the German Empire in 1870 and 1871 , Belgian neutrality suddenly became a safeguard for France against Germany ’s growing strength . Chancellor Otto von Bismarck , who had no desire to alien Britain , reaffirmed Germany ’s commitment to Belgian disinterest in 1871 . Nevertheless , in the early days of the twentieth century it was wide suspected that Germany might violate Belgian disinterest in an attempt to beat France ’s new justificatory fortification and outflank Gallic U. S. Army from the north . Of course this was precisely what the Germans visualise in theSchlieffen Plan — and of course they had to deny it up and down .
British and Gallic care were share by German anti - war socialists , who deeply distrust Germany ’s materialistic military establishment ( for good grounds ) . Thus on April 29 , 1913 , a prominent Social Democrat , Hugo Haase , bedevil down the gantlet in a speech to the Reichstag , noting , “ In Belgium the approach of a Franco - German war is viewed with apprehensiveness , because it is fear that Germany will not respect Belgian neutrality . ” After this blunt reminder there was no way to avoid the discipline , and the German governing was forced to make a public contract .
The government response was delivered by foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow ( above ) , who reassured the Reichstag that “ Belgian neutrality is provided for by international convention , and Germany is determined to abide by those conventions . ” The message was reiterated by war minister Josias von Heeringen , who promised parliament that “ Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the disinterest of Belgium is guarantee by international treaty . ” uncalled-for to say , both men were aware that the Schlieffen Plan called for the violation of Belgian disinterest — Jagow since January 1913 and von Heeringen since December 1912 , at the latest . In fact , both were in person controvert to it on the yard that it would provoke Britain to enter the war against Germany , as indeed it did ( they were ultimately ignored , and in any event their individual views ca n’t excuse these bald-headed - faced lies to the public ) .
Austria-Hungary Mobilizes Against Montenegro
Thefallof Scutari to Montenegro on April 23 , 1913 — the last major outcome of the First Balkan War — triggered yet another diplomatical crisis which threatened to harry a much larger battle . spur to action by the Austro - Hungarian state of war party led by honcho of stave Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf , foreign diplomatic minister Count Berchtold demanded that the Montenegrins withdraw from Scutari , which had been assigned to the new , sovereign state of Albania by the Great Powers at theConference of London . Meanwhile , Berchtold also put pressure on the other Great Powers to back up their decision with the terror of power against Montenegro , presently under blockade by a transnational fleet — and if France , Britain , and Russia were n’t willing to use military activity to enforce their will , he warned , Austria - Hungary would do it for them . But on April 2 , Russian alien diplomatic minister Sergei Sazonov had insisted that Austria - Hungary could not work alone ; Berchtold ’s threat raised the opening of anotherstandoffbetween Austria - Hungary and Russia — or even war .
On April 25 , 1913 , the Conference of London reject Berchtold ’s asking for a naval bombardment of Montenegrin personnel . Meanwhile , German foreign rector Jagow evidence the Austro - Hungarian ambassador in Berlin , Count Szogeny , that Germany would put up military action by Austria - Hungary against Montenegro , even if it was unilateral ( meaning , against the wishes of the other Great Powers ) ; the next 24-hour interval the Germans warned the Conference that Austria - Hungary might go forward against Montenegro on its own . On April 28 , Berchtold repeated his postulation for a naval bombardment , but ( expecting another slight ) also decided to go ahead with Austria - Hungary ’s own military preparations .
On April 29 , 1913 , Austria - Hungary mobilized divisions in Bosnia - Herzegovina and began massing troops near the Montenegrin border . The following day , Jagow monish the French ambassador in Berlin , Jules Cambon , that if the situation spiral out of control , resulting in a Russian attack on Austria - Hungary , Germany would tolerate beside her friend . On May 2 , the Austro - Hungarian cabinet agreed to military measure against Montenegro , and the Germans repeated their support for aggressive action . Once again Europe seesaw on the edge of disaster .
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